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Godwin and "The Great Springs of 
Human Passion" 
T H O M A S B A L F O U R E L D E R 
M UCH OF THE RECENT, increased attention paid to the writ-
ings of W i l l i a m Godwin, particularly in published papers, has 
been directed towards interpretations of Caleb Williams. When 
reference is made to Political Justice, there is usually an assump-
tion that we know what that work is about, and clear distinctions 
are rarely made between the first edition of Political Justice and 
the later editions. 1 
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the significance 
of an aspect of the 1793 Political Justice which has been essen-
tially ignored, and sometimes even denied, 2 by commentators. 
This is Godwin's involvement with what he himself called, in an 
unpublished 1800 comment on what he was doing in 1790, "the 
great springs of human passion." This involvement demonstrates 
that Godwin is too readily caricatured as an arid rationalist and 
too simple a distinction drawn between the author of Political 
Justice and the novelist who wrote Caleb Williams. 
A t the outset, it is necessary to exercise caution when isolating 
some of Godwin's later comments on his intentions when writing 
Political Justice. We should, for instance, be aware that there is 
an 1800 colouring in the insistence, in his unpublished "Auto-
biographical Notes 1773-1796," that the "original conception" 
of Political Justice "proceeded" from "reflecting" on "the im-
perfections & errors of Montesquieu, & a desire of supplying a 
less faulty work." 3 Certainly, Godwin was highly critical of 
Montesquieu's praise of the English constitution (see PJ, I, 271-
72, I I , 65-66 and I I I , 302). H e also specifically attacked M o n -
tesquieu's view that, " i n a free state, every man wil l be his own 
legislator" (Ibid., I, 221-22). Nor was he prepared to accept 
16 
THOMAS BALFOUR ELDER 
Montesquieu's emphasis on "the influence of climate." 4 A l l the 
same, this description of the "original conception" does not make 
us aware of the inner compulsion within Godwin that is so strik-
ingly manifested in the first edition of Political justice. 
The comment, however, also found in the 1800 "Autobio-
graphical Notes," on what he was doing in 1790 is more reveal-
ing of his state of mind at that time : 
. . . in this year I wrote a tragedy on the story of St. Dunstan, 
being desirous, in writing a tragedy, of developing the great 
springs of human passion, & in the choice of a subject, of incul-
cating those principles, on which I apprehended the welfare of 
the human race to depend. 
Here, there is no attempt to hide what was engaging his whole 
being in 1790, however foolish this might appear in the lapse of 
time. 
There is, too, a similar emphasis on both "principles" and "the 
great springs of human passion" in his critique, also unpublished, 
of the first part of T o m Paine's Rights of Man. Although this 
critique is undated, we know, from his " D i a r y , " that Godwin was 
deeply interested in "Paine's pamphlet" on its publication in 
February 1791.5 The internal evidence of the comment also sug-
gests that it was written immediately after the first part of Rights 
of Man was published : 
The pamphlet has exceeded my expectations, & appears to be 
nearly the best performance that can be written upon the subject. 
It does not confine itself, as an injudicious answer would have 
done, to a cold refutation of M r . Burke's errors, but with equal 
discernment & philanthropy, embraces every opportunity of im-
pressing the purest principles of liberty upon the breasts of man-
kind. It is perhaps impossible to rise from perusing it, without 
feeling oneself both wiser & better. The seeds of revolution it con-
tains are so vigorous in their stamina, that nothing can overpower 
them. A l l that remained for the illustrious author, after having 
enlightened the whole western world by the publication of Com-
mon Sense, was to do a similar service to Europe, by a produc-
tion as energetic as that was & adapted with equal skill to rouse 
& interest the mind. The effects, it may be, of this work will not 
be so rapid; but, if properly disseminated (& prosecution cannot 
injure i t ) , will be as Stoic.6 
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Here, we are made strongly aware of Godwin's approval of 
ardour and energy in his recognition that Rights of Man was not 
" a cold refutation of M r . Burke's errors." Paine "embraces every 
opportunity of impressing the purest principles of liberty upon 
the breasts of mankind," where Godwin's use of the word, " i m -
pressing," gives value to the ability of vigorously communicated 
ideas to "impress" themselves upon the receptive mind. There is 
explicit recognition of the energy of Paine's work, and, when he 
notes how it is "adapted . . . to ruse and interest the m i n d , " we 
are forced to bring to mind the importance Godwin places, in 
Political Justice, on the rousing of the mind (see, for instance, 
PJ, I I , 5 ) . Similarly, when he comments on its being almost 
impossible "to rise from perusing it, without feeling oneself both 
wiser & better," we cannot but think both of how, in Political 
Justice, Godwin was concerned to produce 
. . . a work from the perusal of which no man should rise without 
being strengthened in habits of sincerity, fortitude and justice 
{Ibid., I, vii) 
and of his 1832 comment on the genesis of Caleb Williams: 
I said to myself a thousand times, " I will write a tale, that shall 
constitute an epoch in the mind of the reader, that no one, after 
he has read it, shall ever be exactly the same man that he was 
before."7 
Most importantly, however, for an understanding of Godwin, he 
sees no contradiction between his approval of the "vigorous . . . 
stamina" of "the seeds of revolution" present in Rights of Man 
and his conviction that its "effects" wi l l be "as Stoic" as those of 
Common Sense. Before he began Political Justice, Godwin was 
convinced that, whilst man needed the Stoic's (and the Calvin-
ist's) ability to resist the corrupting influence of established 
values,8 it was not possible, in an exploration of man's true 
nature, to ignore "the great springs of human passion." 
Glearly, in Political Justice, Godwin placed much importance 
on "design." 9 The titles of each Book show the value he placed 
upon a logically developed structure, and there are numerous 
examples where Godwin informs the reader of an issue that wi l l 
be examined more closely later on in the work (see, for instance, 
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PJ, I I I , 140). Nevertheless, as in Caleb Williams,10 there is a 
progressive development in the work which is accentuated by the 
fact that he had completed parts of the book printed during the 
course of composition and could not change them (PJ, I, viii-Lx). 
I want to argue that, for an understanding of the essential 
"meaning" of Political Justice, attention has to be directed to its 
inner "movement." There is a preparedness to change as he 
engages himself more deeply with the content. There is, too, an 
engagement with events, particularly the September Massacres 
and the ensuing battle of Valmy, that has a profound effect upon 
the "movement." 
A n important change of direction can be seen in his thinking 
when we examine the holograph of Political Justice. His interest 
in "inculcating those principles, on which . . . [he] apprehended 
the welfare of the human race to depend" is qualified by his 
awareness of the limitations of the individual "perceptor." H e 
seriously considers the ability of "government" to take over this 
important function, stressing, too, that it is "not merely by 
reasoning" that 
A state may . . . endeavour to persuade its members that the supe-
riority of motive is on the side of virtue. It can do more than this. 
It can actually annex reward to the conduct it approves, or 
render the honour & esteem of the community by some legislative 
provision a matter of notoriety, or exhibit in its code that explicit 
sense of the beauty of justice, that cannot fail gradually to take 
root in the breast of individuals. 1 1 
The reason he gives, in the 1793 Book I, Chapter I V , for his 
rejection of this argument draws attention to the importance he 
placed upon the "spring of act ion . " 1 2 Quoting, not quite exactly, 1 3 
from John Logan's Elements of the Philosophy of History, Part 
First, he argues that 
. . . government 'lays its hand upon the spring there is in society, 
and puts a stop to its motion.' (PJ, I II , 247) 
The development of Godwin's argument in the 1793 Book I 
comes to a climax in the final chapter of this book. Having cate-
gorically denied that man is a victim of original sin (Ibid., I I I , 
141), he nevertheless reveals a deep involvement with the view 
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propounded by Paine in Common Sense. Paine argues that "the 
obligations of law and government" would be "unnecessary" for 
"newly arrived emigrants": 
. . . but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will un-
avoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount the first 
difficulties of emigration, they will begin to relax in their duty 
and attachment to each other; and this remissness will point out 
the necessity, of establishing some form of government to supply 
the defect of moral virtue. 1 4 
In his answer, Godwin sees a reinforcement being given to man's 
reason by "the power of social institutions" and by the "fact" 
that 
Large bodies of men, when once they have been enlightened and 
persuaded, act with more vigour than solitary individuals. They 
animate the mutual exertions of each other, and the united forces 
of example and shame urge them to perseverance. 
Here, there is a stress on the " impulse" that a "whole society 
receives . . . from the same cause that acts upon any individual" 
as well as a Helvetian emphasis on "an entirely new situation" : 
New ideas are suggested, and the surprise of novelty conspires 
with the approbation of truth to prevent men from falling back 
into imbecility and languor. (PJ, I, 107-08 and III , 145) 
This chapter was written, as was noted in Godwin's Diary ( V o l . 
V ) , during the Birmingham Trials of November 1792. As these 
trials would have undoubtedly forced him to recall the riots in 
the previous July, the point should be made that there is no evi-
dence in what has been isolated from the chapter to support 
Gary Kelly's argument that the Birmingham Riots were looked 
upon by Godwin as " a severe setback to the advance of reason." 1 6 
It is characteristic of Godwin's thinking that he should wish to 
utilize the energies, so strongly displayed in the riots, but, in that 
case, directed by false opinion, into productive channels. 
The final chapter of the 1793 Book I is only, however, a stage 
in the development of his thinking. It is alien to a fundamental 
aspect of Godwin's outlook on the world that he should look 
upon society as greater than the sum of its parts (see PJ, I, 136 
and I I , 145). It is significant that, for the later editions, "social 
institutions" in the passage quoted was replaced by "reasonable 
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and just ideas," and the reference to "large bodies of men" was 
omitted (Ibid., I, 107). 
A more important stage in the work is reached when Godwin 
is forced to engage himself with the 1792 events in France. This 
engagement brings about his deepest involvement with man's 
passional nature. 
Volume II of the original edition is characterized by remark-
able energy in the writing as he becomes increasingly optimistic 
about the emergence of a new society and about his contribution 
to the form this new society would take. This optimism received 
a setback when the French declared war on Austria in A p r i l 
1792 (see Ibid., I I , 149 and I I I , 185). The fact, however, that 
the battle of Va lmy succeeded upon the September Massacres 
restored his optimism, and, indeed, made it unbounded. There is 
a new emphasis in the work as the implications of the battle of 
Va lmy give him a confidence in the ability of men (individual 
men, not now "large bodies of men") to grow in consciousness 
and direct their emotions into realizeable, positive goals. Under-
lying this optimism is the confirmation, seemingly given by the 
events in France, of his eighteenth-century belief in the essential 
order and harmony within the universe, and its relation to the 
"natural" processes of man's mind. H e agrees that " i t is a dread-
ful remedy, for the people to yield to all their furious passions," 
but this, he argues, is only "before reflection and judgment" 
come to man's " a i d " : 
. . . the spectacle of their effects gives strength to recovering rea-
son. (Ibid., III , 188) 
It was, however, to a new harmony and a new order that God-
win was looking in what were, for h im, the halcyon days of the 
early 1790's. As he continues to reveal unbounded optimism in 
the implications of the events in France, there is, it is true, a 
concern to qualify the nonetheless expressed view that "anarchy 
awakens m i n d " and "diffuses energy and enterprise through the 
community" in the added clause : 
. . . though it does not effect this in the best manner, as its fruits, 
forced into ripeness, must not expect to have the vigorous sta-
mina of true excellence. 
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Nevertheless, when he argues that "the scene in which anarchy 
shall terminate principally depends upon the state of mind by 
which it has been preceded," he is strongly optimistic about the 
implications of this perception for the present. Because "the 
regions of philosophy . . . have been penetrated," and "political 
t ruth" has "opened her school to mankind" : 
The revolutions of the present age (for every total revolution is a 
species of anarchy) promise much happier effects than the revo-
lutions of any former p e r i o d . . . [(Ibid., II, 369, 371 and III, 
205) 
Whilst he places importance on a high level of consciousness, he 
does not reveal the "fear of revolution" which K . N . Cameron 
sees as "the reason" for Godwin's "rejection of political organiza-
t ion." N o r does he reveal any want of "enthusiasm for the 
people," the lack of which, in Cameron's view, distinguishes 
Political Justice from "the works of professional revolutionaries 
like Paine or M a r y Wollstonecraft." 1 6 
Cameron's interest in Godwin, in " T h e Young Shelley," is 
mainly directed towards the influence of Political Justice upon 
Shelley. However, whilst he makes the point that "Shelley was 
acquainted with all three editions but seems to have preferred 
the first," Cameron's criterion for departing from the 1798 text 
printed in the Priestley volumes is "when that of the first ( 1793) 
or second editions seems to me to present the text more clearly" 
(Ibid., note 111, p. 323). There is, consequendy, no attempt to 
see the 1793 edition as a work having a unity and "meaning" 
that are peculiar to itself. It is perhaps a little alarming to 
discover that, when Cameron makes the point about Political 
Justice which has been quoted, all the supporting evidence for 
his influential view is in extracts from the later editions of God-
win's philosophical work (see Ibid., notes 132, 134 and 135, p. 
324)-
Cameron isolates for emphasis the Political Justice view that 
The new society would be achieved by small bands of enlightened 
philosophers who would, little by little, convert their fellows — 
including "the rich and great" — to the justice of their v iews. . . . 
(Ibid., p. 68) 
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This point of view is undoubtedly present in Political Justice 
(see PJ, I I , 541 ). The naïve attitude to "the rich and great" is, 
however, strongly influenced, as Godwin made clear for the 1796 
edition, by his continuing admiration for Burke (see Ibid., I I I , 
231 and footnote, Ibid., I I , 545-46). A t the same time, it was 
an admiration which co-existed with a strong conviction that the 
author of the "Reflections" had been corrupted by aristocratic 
principles (see PJ, I I , 546, footnote for the 1798 edition). The 
attentive reader cannot but be aware that there are numerous 
passages in Political Justice where there are penetrating criticisms 
of the upper classes (see, for instance, PJ, I I , 39). 
Emphasis should also be given to Godwin's conviction that the 
forces of historical necessity were working towards amelioration. 
After insisting that it is " i n v a i n " for "the rich and great" to 
"fight against truth," because it is like endeavouring with the 
human hand to stop the inroad of truth," he warns them not to 
"count upon the numerous train of . . . [their] adherents, re-
tainers and servants." Whilst "some" of these people, he argues, 
. . . will adhere to you as long as a sordid interest seems to draw 
them in that direction . . . the moment yours shall appear to be 
the losing cause, the same interest will carry them over to the 
enemy's standard. They will disappear like the morning dew. 
(Ibid., II, 541-44 and III, 230-31) 
This is the sort of passage that would have attracted the ire of 
the poets of the Anti-Jacobin, whilst Godwin's idealization of 
"the rich and great" would have stimulated merely a detached 
amusement. 
I would like to isolate another aspect of Political Justice that 
demonstrates the "movement" of the work. Godwin's conclusion 
about his main interest, the nature of man, takes two forms in 
the 1793 edition. There is a concern to incorporate, within his 
conclusions, the positive aspects of the degree to which mind is 
passive. Whilst there is stress on a high level of consciousness 
(which he saw as being achieved by ordinary people at the battle 
of V a l m y ) , he also argues that man, having gone from "the 
involuntary" to "the voluntary," should return to "the involun-
tary" (Ibid., I I I , 173). There is emphasis on "spontaneous jus-
tice" (Ibid., I I , 410). H e argues, too, that 
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Every man ought to rest upon his own centre, and consult his 
own understanding. i(Ibid., I l l , 221) 
There is a strong likelihood that, in the valuation placed on 
"rest[ing] u p o n " one's "own centre," Godwin influenced Words-
worth's concern for " a wise passiveness." 1 7 It is also relevant to 
be reminded of Wordsworth's dislike of the second edition of 
Political Justice, where Godwin's emphases, particularly at the 
beginning of the new edition, were very different. 1 8 A t the same 
time, the "movement" of Political Justice is towards the impor-
tance of the active powers of the human mind. 
Certainly, at an early stage of the work, Godwin stresses these 
active powers, as he did in the "Account " he wrote of the school 
he wished to open for twelve pupils in August 1783. 1 9 H e draws 
attention, for instance, early on in Political Justice, to how a 
"generalization," 
. . . which is implied in the very notion of thought, being thus 
embodied and rendered palpable, makes the mind acquainted 
with its own powers and creates a restless desire after farther 
progress. (PJ, I, 115 and III , 146) 
Towards the end of the first volume of Political Justice, however, 
he affirms his acceptance of the Lockeian view of the human 
mind. " M a n , " he argues, although with qualification, 
. . . is in reality a passive, and not an active being. (Ibid., I, 
389) 
Similarly, in Volume I I , whilst affirming the inability to separate 
the faculties of the human mind, he accepts, with an indebted-
ness to the Arminian Dr . Samuel Clarke, 2 0 that "the w i l l " is 
"merely the last act of the understanding" (PJ, I I , 381 ). By the 
end of the work, however, he states, categorically, that 
M i n d . . . in its own nature . . . [is] essentially active. (Ibid., 
111 ,214) 
In a context, too, where he continues to insist that 
M i n d is not an aggregate of various faculties contending with 
each other for the mastery . . . 
there is a significant omission of the word "merely" when he 
refers, once more, to how "the wil l is the last act of the under-
standing" (Ibid., I I I , 232). 
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In the final part of the work, Godwin distinguishes between 
man's "natural independence" and his "moral independence" 
(Ibid., I I , 495-97). However, whilst he insists that man cannot 
be morally independent, his interpretation of the 1792 events in 
France (where ordinary people had shown their "capacity" 2 1 for 
passionate thinking) leads him to give value to "the Faustian 
urge" within man. M a n is seen as capable of going beyond 
morality, and in this sense his powers become unbounded. H e 
accepts that "without external impressions we should be noth-
ing . " Nevertheless, he also shows himself attracted to a concept 
of the " m i n d " by which it is not only "now in a great degree the 
ruler of the system," but is capable of "extending its empire." 
"If," he asks, 
. . . volition can now do something, why should it not go on to do 
still more and more? 
His answer is that 
Nothing can be more irrational and presumptuous to conclude, 
because a certain species of supposed power is entirely out of the 
line of our present observations, that it is therefore altogether 
beyond the limits of the human mind. We talk familiarly indeed 
of the limits of our faculties, but nothing is more difficult than to 
point them out. M i n d , in a progressive view at least, is infinite. 
(PJ, I I , 525 and III , 225) 
There can be no doubt that, as early as St. Irvyne (written 
1810, published 1811), Shelley was influenced by the Faustian-
ism in the first edition of Political Justice, as well as by Godwin's 
critical engagement with "the Faustian urge" in St. Leon 
^799)-^ 
Godwin began the reassessment of the Faustianism of Political 
Justice in Caleb Williams (1794). It is an aspect of Godwin's 
most important novel to which a number of commentators, par-
ticularly Walter Al len , James Rieger and Christopher Small, 
have given emphasis, in various phraseology. 2 2 The emphasis, 
however, in these writings ignores Godwin's conviction, again 
more strongly present in the first edition of Political Justice than 
in the other editions, of the unitary nature of the personality. 2 3 
Rieger, for instance, sees "the Faustian urge" within Political 
Justice as having its source in "the sense-fed understanding," the 
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whole work being characterized by the dominating presence of 
the "monstrosity of cold intellect. . . . the understanding's naked 
self, stalking at noonday." 2 4 In spite of the extremity of his lan-
guage, there is a modicum of truth in Rieger's view. W e should 
be aware, as he is, of the deep influence, however ambivalent, 2 5 
upon Godwin of his Sandemanian tutor, the Rev. Samuel 
Newton. Attention has already been drawn, i n this paper, to 
Godwin's significant omission of the word "merely" when, to-
wards the end of Political Justice, he refers, once more, to how 
"the wi l l is the last act of the understanding." It is also impor-
tant to draw attention, as Rieger does, to Godwin's untitled 
memorandum of "10 M a r c h 1800" in which he defines the 
"three" main "errors" which "blemished . . . The Enquiry con-
cerning Political Justice" : 
1. Stoicism, or an inattention to the principle, that pleasure and 
pain are the only bases upon which morality can rest. 
2. Sandemanianism, or an inattention to the principle, that feel-
ing, and not judgment, is the source of human actions. 
3. The unqualified condemnation of the private affections.26 
Nevertheless, there is only a modicum of truth in Rieger's view, 
particularly when we have in mind the first edition of Political 
Justice. H e argues, for instance, that the " imagination" is " a 
power excluded significantly, from the psychological system of 
Political Justice."27 Attention, particularly to the " A p p e n d i x " to 
the 1793 chapter, " O f Obedience," as well as elsewhere (see, for 
instance, PJ, I I I , 338), shows that this is not so. Indeed, as early 
as "Account of the Seminary," Godwin displays a strong interest 
in a view of the imagination, present in d'Holbach's Systeme de 
la Nature, whereby the "reason" remains in control. 2 8 Godwin 
does use the word, " imagination," in Political Justice, to signify 
a flight from reality, which he condemns (see PJ, I, 106). How-
ever, in the two other passages referred to in this paragraph, 
there is a real awareness of the importance of the penetrating 
power of the imagination. 
When, too, we examine the significance of Godwin's memoran-
dum of "10 M a r c h 1800," we should be aware that the attack 
on the primacy given by Sandemanianism to the "judgment" 
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has, in an important respect, greater relevance for the 1796 
edition than for the first edition. It is significant that he often 
substitutes the word, "intellect" (1796), for the 1793 word, 
" m i n d " (see, for instance, Ibid., I I I , 222). The 1793 valuation 
of a "virtuous disposition" in his argument for "true virtue" is 
also played down for the 1796 edition, with the objective crite-
rion consequently much more stressed (see Ibid., I I I , 251 and I, 
156). Whilst, too, as Godwin stated in his memorandum of "10 
M a r c h 1800," he was concerned to correct the valuation he had, 
in 1793, placed on Stoicism " i n the subsequent edition of Polit i-
cal Justice," there is, in the 1796 Book I, Chapter V , an attempt 
to argue that man can be governed by his reason, which is both 
more extreme than in the first edition and far from convincing 
(see PJ, I, 71-74). As with the substitution of "intellect" for 
" m i n d , " we find an attraction towards the possibility of a separa-
tion of the mind's faculties. This is by no means always the case 
in the 1796 Book I, Chapter V . When, however, he argues, in 
this chapter, that 
. . . whatever can be adequately brought home to the conviction 
of the understanding, may be depended upon as affording a 
secure hold upon the conduct. We are no longer at liberty to 
consider man as divided between two independent principles, or 
to imagine that his inclinations are in any case inaccessible 
through the medium of his reason . . . (Ibid., I, 79-80) 
there is not the emphasis present in the 1793 edition on the 
ability of "reason" to coalesce with "passion," so that " a degree 
of conviction" is given to where truth lies (see Ibid., I II , 338). 
Instead, the stress is on "the conviction of the understanding" 
and on the accessibility of man's "inclinations . . . through the 
medium of reason." 
Neither Godwin, nor his wide influence, particularly on his 
contemporaries, can be sufficiently understood if we do not 
realize that the writing of the first edition of Political Justice 
engaged his whole being. As a consequence, too, of Godwin's 
interest in "the great springs of human passion," there is a dyna-
mism in the 1793 Political Justice, arising from his conviction 
that the forces of historical necessity were working towards the 
betterment of man. These were active forces, present in matter, 
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and as much "underlying both intelligence and the very forms 
of being" as in particular aspects of Wordsworth's poetry. The 
phrase quoted is H . W . Piper's, which he uses to define what 
"differentiated" Wordsworth " from the rationalist believers in 
progress, though not . . . from a wider current of late eighteenth 
century thought." 2 0 There can be little doubt that Piper, like 
most commentators, has Godwin in mind as the leader of "the 
rationalist believers in progress." It is consequently necessary to 
stress that Godwin was, and before Wordsworth, excited by this 
"current" of "thought." 8 0 The belief of the late 1780's and early 
1790's that ultimate truths were not only able to be discovered 
but were about to be so 3 1 should be seen as underlying the con-
viction, made manifest in the "process" of writing Political Jus-
tice, that it was impossible for the "evidence of what is best or 
what is most beneficial" to be "thrown away upon" men: 
Truth for a long time spreads itself unobserved. . . . The number 
of those by whom it is embraced is gradually enlarged. If it have 
relation to their practical interests, if it show them that they may 
be a thousand times more happy and free than at present, it is 
impossible that in its perpetual increase of evidence and enquiry, 
it should not at last break the bounds of speculation, and become 
an animating principle of action. [PJ, II, 226 and III , 191) 
This is the culmination of the "movement" of the first edition 
of Political Justice. The conviction should be seen as central to 
an understanding of the work. It is also important to stress that 
the excitement at his findings persisted into Caleb Williams, 
which, in Godwin's own words, was "the offspring of that temper 
of mind in which the composition . . . of Political Justice had 
left" 3 2 him. A t the same time, it was an excitement that had to 
engage, in 1793-1794, with different conditions and with his own 
changed convictions. Besides developing, in Caleb Williams, the 
plight of the individual in an oppressive society, Godwin is forced 
to reassess the eighteenth-century belief in the essential harmony 
within the universe. H e could not look upon the Terror in the 
same way that he regarded the outcome of the September Mas-
sacres: as illustrating how "the spectacle" of yielding to "furious 
passions . . . gives strength to recovering reason." There is, in 
Caleb Williams, an ambivalence (see, for instance, CW, pp. 121-
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25) with regard to "the great springs of human passion" which 
leads to the defensiveness present in Book I, Chapter V of the 
1796 Political Justice. 
Before Godwin concluded the second edition of Political Jus-
tice, he attempted to restore the importance he had given, in the 
first edition, to the passions. As he stated in his " M a r c h 10 
1800" memorandum, he became convinced, as a result of his 
"perusal of Hume's Treatise of H u m a n Nature" in 1795, that 
"feeling & not judgment was the source of human actions." In 
the continuation of this note, he draws attention to how 
The second edition of Political Justice was then nearly printed 
off, but the change of my sentiments may be traced in the later 
sheets of each of the volumes. 
A n examination of these late corrections reveals a fundamental 
shift from the attempt, in the 1796 Book I, Chapter V , to make 
excessive claims for the "reason." A t the same time, Godwin was 
not prepared to incorporate into these late changes for the 1796 
edition his involvement, in Caleb Williams, with the possibility 
of a tension between the "heart" when "the ve i l " is drawn back 
and the presence of a "fortitude" which might "to some persons 
appear above the standard of human nature" (CW, p. 278). 
Nor do we find the impassioned convictions of the 1793 edition 
of Political Justice. What is present is a concern to define a cri-
terion which can engage man's feelings. This criterion is not that 
of the 1793 "justice," which is true in almost any situation (see 
PJ, I, 133-37), but is incorporated within " a scale of happin-
ness" (see Ibid., I, 444) , enabling man to take into his being an 
awareness of where true happiness lies. 
The new criterion, with "the man of benevolence" being given 
greater value than the man who was "perhaps . . . a poet" (see 
Ibid., I, 446) , gives importance to sentiment, but there is no 
longer the deep engagement with "the great springs of human 
passion." For this preoccupation in Godwin's post-1793 writings, 
we have to turn to his novels, not only to Caleb Williams but 
also to the best parts of St. Leon and of Fleetwood ( 1805), as 
well as to the novel which demands reassessment for its un-
flinching exploration of a Calvinist nurture : Mandeville ( 1817 ). 
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The success these novels achieve is due in no small part, I would 
argue, to the continued presence of the man who, in his explora-
tion of the nature of man in the 1793 Political Justice, wrote, not 
simply with his intellect but from the very depths of his being. 
N O T E S 
1 See, for instance, Gerald A . Barker, "Justice to Caleb Williams," Studies 
in the Novel, Vol. 6, 1974, particularly p. 383, where the reference to 
Political Justice ignores the fact that the passage referred to was written 
after Caleb Williams had been completed. See also Marilyn Butler, Jane 
Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: O.U.P. , 1975). Mrs. Butler does 
comment on the significance of the changes for the later editions of Poli-
tical Justice (see pp. 66-67). At the same time, importance is placed, in 
her understanding of the work, on the 1796 Book I, Chapter V , without 
attention being drawn to the fact that this was a new chapter for the 
1796 edition (see pp. 40-41 and footnote 1, p. 41). The now standard 
edition of Political Justice is William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Politi-
cal Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness, 3 vols., edited 
with variant readings of the first and second editions and with a critical 
introduction and notes by F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto: Univ. Dept. of 
Eng. Stud, and Texts, no. 2, 1946). Apart from one instance in my 
"Notes," this edition is used throughout and is referred to as PJ. 
2 As by James Rieger, some of whose comments on Political Justice ate 
quoted below. 
3 "Autobiographical Notes 1773-1796," Abinger MSS., Bodleian Library, 
Oxford, M S Film 73. I should like to thank Lord Abinger for permission 
to read and quote from these manuscripts. Part of the passage quoted 
here is difficult to read. I clearly discern "reflecting," whilst Kegan Paul 
reproduces the part difficult to read as "on a feeling of." See C. Kegan 
Paul, William Godwin: His Friends and Contemporaries, 2 vols. (Lon-
don: H . S. King, 1876), I, 67. 
4 The first part of the 1793 Book I, Chapter V I , entitled " O f Moral and 
Physical Causes," the whole chapter having the title, " O f the Objection 
to These Principles from the Influence of Climate," is omitted from the 
Priestley edition, although he does mention that "a few sentences of the 
new" (i.e., the 1796 edition) Book I, Chapter V "were originally con-
tained in the old Bk. I, eh. vii" (PJ, III, 143). It is perhaps revelatory 
of the lack of knowledge of the 1793 Political Justice that attention has 
not been drawn, until now, to this fact. For the part omitted in the 
Priestley edition see William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, 2 vols. (Lon-
don: Robinson, 1793), I, 51-60. 
5 See "William Godwin's Diary 1788-1836," Vol. I l l , Abinger MSS. See, 
particularly, entries for 22nd February 1791 : "Paine's pamphlet appears," 
27th February 1791 : "Call on Paine" and 2nd March 1791: "borrow 
Paine." 
8 Undated comment, as found in Abinger MSS., M S Film 73. 
7 William Godwin, Fleetwood: Or, The New Man of Feeling (London, R. 
Bentley, 1832), p. ix. 
30 
THOMAS BALFOUR ELDER 
8 Note Godwin's use of the phrase, "the contagion of general example" — 
PJ, III, 244, and his contempt for what he calls "a visible standard" — 
Ibid., II, 203. 
9 Note Godwin's praise of a "lofty design" —Ibid., I, 325. 
1 0 Note the qualification, made by Godwin in the 1794 Preface to Caleb 
Williams, on his didactic purpose in that novel : "as far as the progressive 
nature of a single story would allow" — William Godwin, Caleb Williams, 
edited with an Introduction by David McCracken (London: O.U.P., 
1970), p. I. Further references to Caleb Williams are made to this edition, 
which is referred to as CW. 
1 1 Manuscript of Political Justice in 3 Volumes, Forster Collection, Victoria 
and Albert Museum, I, 14-15. 
1 2 A phrase used by Godwin. See PJ, III, 310. Note, too, his use of the 
phrases, "the regulating spring of our conduct"—Ibid., III, 224, and 
"the true spring there is in mind — Ibid., II, 64. 
1 3 See John Logan, Elements of the Philosophy of History, Part First (Edin-
burgh: W. Creech and C. Elliot, 17O1), pp. 69-70, where Logan argues 
that "Lycurgus" brought about a situation in which "The people were 
arrested in the first stage of improvement. A bold hand was put forth to 
that spring which is in society, and stopt its motion." Godwin's approval 
of Logan's argument does not prevent him, later on in Political Justice, 
from looking upon "Lycurgus" as an "immortal lawgiver" (see PJ, II, 
503-04). A second part of Logan's work was not published. I should like 
to thank the Librarian of Edinburgh University Library for permission to 
xerox-copy parts of this rare book. 
1 4 The Works of Thomas Paine, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: James Carey, 1797), 
I, 6. 
1 5 Gary, Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel ¡780-1805 (Oxford: O.U.P., 
1976), p. 10. 
1 6 K . N. Cameron, The Young Shelley: Genesis of A Radical (London: 
Gollancz, 1951), p. 68. 
1 7 The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, 5 vols; vols. 1 and 2 edited 
by E. de Selincourt and 3-5 by de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire 
(Oxford: O.U.P. , 1940-1949), IV, 56: Expostulation and Reply, I.24. 
1 8 See below for comment on the 1796 Book I, Chapter V . See, too, John 
Beer, "Blake, Coleridge and Wordsworth: Some Cross-currents and Paral-
lels" in William Blake, Essays in honour of Sir Geoffrey Keynes, edited 
by Morton D. Paley and Michael Phillips (Oxford: O.U.P., 1973), pp. 
240-41 and footnotes 28-31, p. 240. See also Mary Moorman, William 
Wordsworth, A Biography, 2 vols. (Oxford: O.U.P., 1957-1965), I, 297. 
1 9 See [William Godwin], An Account of the Seminary That will be opened 
on Monday the Fourth Day of August, At Epsom in Surrey, For the 
Instruction of Twelve Pupils in the Greek, Latin, French, and English 
Languages, London, 1783, as reproduced in William Godwin, Four Early 
Pamphlets (1783-1784), Facsimile Reproductions with an introduction by 
Burton R. Pollin (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles and Re-
prints), 1966, p. 195. 
2 0 For the later editions, Godwin refers, in a footnote at PJ, II, 381, to 
"Clarke." For Dr. Samuel Clarke's emphasis on "the last Judgment of the 
Understanding," see The Works of Samuel Clarke, 4 vols, (London: John 
GODWIN AND "POLITICAL JUSTICE" 31 
and Paul Knapton, 1738), II, 565. Note, too, that Jonathan Edwards, 
who influenced Godwin's view of "the nature of true virtue," refers to 
"Arminian writers," such as "Dr. Samuel Clarice," who agree "that the 
acts of the will have some connection with the dictates or views of the 
understanding" — The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 4 vols., edited by Paul 
Ramsay (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), I, 217. 
2 1 A n important word in Godwin's vocabulary. See, for instance, PJ, III, 
153 and III, 165. 
2 2 For Allen and Small, see Walter Allen, Introduction to William Godwin, 
The Adventures of Caleb Williams or Things As They Are (London: 
Cassell, 1966), p. xiv, and Christopher Small, Ariel Like a Harpy, Shelley, 
Mary and 'Frankenstein' (London: Gollancz, 1972), pp. 74-80. 
2 3 Godwin's belief in "the theory of the unitary personality" is emphasized 
by Kennedy F. Roche, Rousseau: Stoic & Romantic (London: Methuen, 
'974)) PP- xii-xvi. 
2 4 James Rieger, The Mutiny Within: The Heresies of P. B. Shelley (New 
York: G. Braziller, 1967), pp. 44, 46, 47. 
2 5 Rieger quotes (Ibid., pp. 41-43) from Godwin's "Autobiographical Frag-
ment," Abinger MSS., MS Film 73, the most important part of which is: 
"I was under the control of a despot; & I resolved he should not be a 
despot to me, where I could avoid it. Never mortal felt more energetically 
the sentiment, 'My mind, my mind, shall be the master of m e ! ' " God-
win's ambivalence towards Newton is particularly shown in a passage 
from this "Fragment," not quoted by Rieger: " . . . during the last seven 
months of the year 1770" Godwin "voluntarily withdrew from Newton's 
"tuition." However, "at the beginning of the year 1771" he "requested 
once more to return to the tuition of Newton." Rieger is right to empha-
size that Godwin was interested in Newton's reactions to Political Justice. 
See Rieger, op. cit., p. 44. 
2 8 Abinger MSS., MS Film 75. 
2 7 Rieger, op. cit., p. 39, 
2 8 See Godwin, "Four Early Pamphlets," op. cit., pp. 195-96. For d'Hol-
bach's influence, see M . de Mirabaud, Nature and Her Laws: As Appli-
cable to The Happiness of Men, Living in Society Contrasted with Super-
stition and Imaginary States, translator's name not mentioned, 2 vols., 
bound in one volume (London: Watson, 1834), I, 104-06. (This work is 
really a translation of d'HoIbach's Système de la Nature.) 
2 9 H . W. Piper, The Active Universe, Pantheism and the concept of Imagi-
nation in the English Romantic poets (London: Athlone Press, 1962), p. 
183. 
3 0 For Godwin's emphasis on the "corporeal" nature of "thought" see PJ, 
II, 481 and for his stress on "motion" see Ibid., II, 524. Beer gives an 
example of Godwin's use of the word, "motion," in Political Justice, but 
describes "the paragraph" as "thrown off rather casually by Godwin" and 
seems unaware of any Godwinian emphasis on corporeality of thought. 
See Beer, in William Blake, Essays in honour of Sir Geoffrey Keynes, op. 
cit., p. 234. 
3 1 Beer deals well with the late 1780's intellectual excitement in the London 
of Coleridge's boyhood. See Ibid., pp. 232-33. 
3 2 "Autobiographical Notes 1773-1796," Abinger MSS., MS Film 73. 
